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This paper explores the network of relationships that emerge from the online activities of privacy advocates. It argues that this 
advocacy network, through its linking practices, may potentially become a network of meta-surveillance that has the potential to 
transcend the agency of the individual actors. By reducing the degrees of separation between the actors, through their linking 
practices, the network can foster links between different sets of data, create links between information about incidents, 
corroborate information (making it more credible), direct the attention of the public and the traditional media to particular state 
surveillance practices, and so forth. Through these linking practices the network can draw upon the emergent positive network 
externalities to realise an information politics that is beyond what any single actor can achieve.  Through the use of social 
network analysis and a webometrics methodology (supported by web-based crawling applications) we attempt to reveal this 
emerging online advocacy network. Through our data collection and analysis we show that the online advocacy network seems 
somewhat fragmented with a relatively small but stable, and geographically biased, core. This tentative analysis and conclusion 





‘Pressure groups and advocacy organizations working on the margins of the actual legal 
processes usually play a part in obtaining the eventual legislative change. But such groups 
also make a contribution to the ‘struggles over surveillance’ in their own right. Although 
they have not yet been studied systematically, it is worth examining the activities of such 
groups. While they may not count as a fully fledged ‘social movement’, they are 
undoubtedly influential in the field.’ 
David Lyon (2007: 173) 
 
The issue of data protection and privacy have been very prominent in the UK media of late due to a 
number of significant data handling breaches—with the subsequent loss of very large (and sensitive) data 
sets. These incidents have raised serious questions about the government’s ability to secure the personal 
information of its citizens. Given the often hidden nature of the use and storage of citizen data—once it 
has been relieved of its owner—the ways in which to monitor or indeed resist the data collection and 
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handling practices of governments have remained elusive. Sousveillance—the view that we can invert the 
all seeing eye of the panopticon—may allow for the actions of the watchers to be exposed and may 
subsequently engender a certain level of accountability on the part of the state. But who will engage in 
such sousveillance on behalf of the citizen? One logical suggestion would be for this to be done by 
advocacy groups. But, as David Lyon (2007) highlighted, the study of advocacy groups, whose purpose 
one might say is to enlighten the public on issues of privacy and who may act as the watcher of the 
watchers, have hitherto received little systematic academic attention—the recent book by Colin Bennett 
(2008) being a notable exception.  
 
Public collaborations between privacy interest groups, such as for example the Surveillance Studies 
Network’s (SSN) joint paper with the UK Information Commissioner’s Office on a Surveillance Society 
(2006), and other individual publications (Liberty, 2007; ACLU, 2003, 2007a, 2007b) at least in some 
way presupposes the notion of some broader advocacy movement, or network of action and resistance, to 
counter the perceived excesses of state surveillance (especially post 9/11).  If there is indeed such a 
broader advocacy movement then one might argue that the possibilities for resistance, for the citizen, lies 
within the combined collective action (or the network of more or less coordinated action) of these actors 
and their intermediaries.  In this paper we want to suggest that the collective agency (intended or 
unintended) of these combined advocacy actors—as an emergent online network—may have the 
propensity to exert pressure on the asymmetrical power imbued by the state,1 through strategies such as 
‘information politics’,2 amongst others, and as such act as one possible mechanism for resisting state 
surveillance practices—possibly constituting what one might call a network of ‘meta-surveillance’3 (i.e. 
for watching the watchers). 
 
In order to develop this argument the paper is structured as follows. First, we explore the importance of 
networks, with a specific focus on the activities of advocacy groups on the Internet. We discuss how the 
linking patterns of these groups can potentially constitute a network with emergent positive network 
externalities that often transcend the intentions and possibilities of individual advocacy actors. Second, we 
discuss the need and mechanisms for resisting state surveillance. We argue that on the one hand we are 
seeing the rapid expansion of state surveillance of citizens’ activities (often under the seemingly legitimate 
need of security or more efficient government) and on the other hand we see a rather rapidly declining 
trust, by the citizens, of the ability of governments to adequately secure the data collected. It is, however, 
not clear (or may not be possible) for individual citizens to resist state surveillance practices.  Some have 
argued that it is the role of advocacy groups to step forward to expose and make visible these practices, so 
as to enact resistance and possible accountability (Bennett 2008).  But how can advocacy groups do this? 
We suggest that they may do this by becoming an expanding and cohesive online network for information 
politics and meta-surveillance. In the third part of the paper we use social network analysis (SNA) to 
attempt to reveal and analyse the hyperlink structure of the online advocacy network.  In doing this we 
explore the extent to which this advocacy network can be seen as a cohesive network that may have the 
potential to resist the practices of state surveillance. We conclude the paper with some preliminary 






                                                     
1 We use state as an umbrella term to encompass a range of governing bodies worldwide      
2 Information politics “relies on the ability to generate politically relevant information and move it by the most effective means 
to the place where it will have the most impact, at the most critical time” (Bennett 2008, 96). 
3 Although the term ‘meta-surveillance is mostly used in the medical context for the monitoring of simultaneous disease 
outbreaks, we will use the term ‘meta-surveillance’ in this paper to imply bringing together of a variety of resources in order to 
generate the conditions that would allow for ‘watching the watchers’.  
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On the virtue of virtual networks 
 
The well known theory that every person in the world is interconnected by a mere six degrees of 
separation4—the so-called small world hypothesis—statistically requires that each individual will have at 
least 100 direct relational contacts, such as friends or family (Watts 2003). These relational contacts are 
likely to share mutual links, with other contacts, thereby introducing certain possible clusterings (or sub-
networks) in the network. Urry (2007) argues that if one simply considers the family and friends network, 
this alone will provide a too large degree of socio-spatial separation for the six degree hypothesis to be 
feasible; what is needed is the intersection of other intermediary actors such as organisations and 
technology to link to a wider audience. For example, Facebook, the popular social networking site, can be 
seen as an example of such an intermediary.5  Indeed, as is known, this media has transcended its virtual 
boundedness and started to connect to other avenues of life, including work, with some job sites6 warning 
that the success of job applications can be as much based on information obtained through social 
networking sites, such as MySpace, Bebo and Facebook, as the information volunteered by the applicant 
on application.  Although the small world hypothesis has been contested in a variety of contexts, it is 
nevertheless helpful in highlighting the importance of networks and the possibilities for networking that 
they may imply. But more than that, the ways in which networks, through network effects, transcend the 
intentions and agency (one might say reach) of individual actors within it. Of course, intuitively we know 
this and, as researchers, we also see this for example in the way citation analysis supposedly reveals 
influence and the impact of research beyond the intentions of individual researchers.   
 
There has been some research to show that the small world hypothesis does apply to the hyperlink 
structure of the Internet under certain conditions (Adamic & Adar 2001; Broder et al 2000; Thelwall & 
Wilkinson 2003; Park & Thelwall 2003). What is disputed is the degree of separation that applies in this 
context.  In some cases it has been shown to be approximately six (Adamic & Adar 2001) in other cases 
it might be as much a sixteen (Broder et al 2000).  As one would expect it is significantly lower when 
one is located within a particular sub-network (such as Facebook for example) than it would be between 
any randomly selected web pages in the world-wide web as a whole. It is therefore feasible to suggest that 
any potential visitor with a particular search interest and an ‘appropriate starting point’ should be able to 
find what they are looking for through navigating more or less six hyperlinks.  An ‘appropriate starting 
point’ is here taken to mean a starting point that locates the searcher in the relevant sub-network. How 
would searchers find ‘appropriate starting points?’ Normally, when searching for information on a 
particular topic area on the Internet, a visitor is likely to perform one of two tasks: 1) enter the name of a 
web address they know contains the type of information they are looking for or 2) more likely, type 
relevant keywords into a search engine and follow the most applicable link from the list provided. In the 
first instance the visitor knows the site which contains the type of information being sought; this 
obviously significantly reduces the number of links they need to use. In the second case the visitor will 
find the appropriate starting point by using the references (links) in a site of interest, or by using the list 
provided by the ranked recommendations of the search engine—which is also itself based on the linking 
patterns of sites.  In other words the context sensitive linking patterns of sites, by their very nature, 
reduces the degrees of separation between relevant or related sites, thereby constituting networks (or 
subnetworks) of common or shared interests. It is important to note that these sub-networks emerge 
without the link creators necessarily wanting to constitute them as such—i.e. as an implicit outcome of 
normal linking behaviour and patterns of web content creators and editors. This is the benefit of context 
sensitive imbedded (hyper)linking, which is at the heart of the network organisation of the web—and the 
                                                     
4 The ‘degrees of separation’ is the number of links one would need to transverse to get from any given node or actor in the 
network to any other given node or actor in the network.   
5  The six degrees of separation experiment is also active on Facebook through a series of applications and groups, one such 
example can be found here: http://www.facebook.com/apps/application.php?id=4616854023 (accessed November 2, 2008) 
6 An example of such a story can be found on the Equinox site: 
http://media.www.keeneequinox.com/media/storage/paper537/news/2008/10/30/Opinions/Employer.Surveillance.Of.Social.Net
work.Sites.Like.Facebook.And.Myspace.Bodes.Il-3511588.shtml (accessed November 3, 2008)  
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success of the Google search engine for that matter. However, not all of these sites (or actors as we shall 
refer to them) have equal status in the sub-network, some are at the core and some are in the periphery.    
 
If we consider a particular hyperlink sub-network (or ‘installed base’ as referred to by Ciborra (2002)) in 
the global world-wide web network, then we are likely to encounter a relatively stable core of actors that 
are steadily affecting changes in the periphery through their ongoing linking practices. These core actors 
tend to have a high level of visibility (through advertisement, word of mouth or search engine 
prominence) and as such are disproportionately likely to be visited and linked to repeatedly, thus, 
affording them growing importance or centrality in the network. As Barabási explains:  
 
‘the bottom line is that when deciding where to link on the Web, we follow preferential 
attachment: When choosing between two pages, one with twice as many links as the 
other, about twice as many people link to the more connected page. While our individual 
choices are highly unpredictable, as a group we [tend to] follow strict patterns’ (2002:85). 
 
Once linked, the visitor’s experience is then arguably constructed by the site as they attempt to guide their 
visitor down particular avenues of interest. The more time that is spent on the site, in principle at least, the 
more knowledge is gleaned for self-interest or dissemination purposes. There are, of course, external 
constraints on this process to be aware of, such as the following: technological know-how, economic 
factors (cost of staying on the Internet browsing), knowledge of the topic area being searched and 
recommendations from personal networks.  
 
Barabási (2002) suggests that there are certain intrinsic power laws that operate in such sub-networks. One 
of the most central theories is that the power to successfully expand a network lies with the core actors. 
Sites on the periphery, i.e. the weakly linked to sites, might contain information which could be of benefit 
the whole network, but only if they are rendered visible to other actors in the network—i.e. are drawn into 
the network through increased linking (Buchanan 2002). One might argue that it is therefore in the interest 
of the core actors to continually search for and post up-to-date links to relevant sites on the periphery. As 
these sites are pulled closer to the centre of the network the sites they link to, which may previously have 
only existed outside this specialised network, on the wider world-wide web, will themselves be pulled in, 
creating a greater level of interconnectedness to the benefit of the whole network. Differently stated, it 
would increase the density of the network; and the higher the density of the network the lower the degrees 
of separation between any two actors in the sub-network. Increasing the density of the network is often 
referred to as positive network externality, i.e. where benefit is unintentionally created for the whole 
network through the behaviour of mostly self-interested individual actors. Thus, such behaviour would 
create a virtuous cycle of interconnectedness (density or cohesion) and increased visibility for all the 
members of the network.  
 
Drawing on these principles of networks, and the hyperlink structure of the web, we would argue that the 
individual actors that are concerned with state surveillance (such as privacy activists, advocates, 
researchers, etc) can potentially, through their linking practices, constitute a network that has, as one of its 
network externalities, the possibility of being a cohesive network of information politics and meta-
surveillance. In other words through their linking behaviour (and the information they make available 
through such links) actors in the sub-network can develop a collective awareness of emerging state 
surveillance practices—by for example following up and linking together incidents, corroborating 
information, making links between different data sets, and so forth.  But to what degree does such an 
online advocacy network exist and act in the ways suggested? One way to answer this question is to 
attempt to reveal this network through a network analysis of its hyperlinking structure, using relevant tools 
and techniques (Borgatti et al. 2002, Nooy et al. 2005).  However, before doing this we want to suggest 
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On the need and mechanisms to resist state surveillance  
 
‘The State is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest 
the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth. True, these 
networks stand in a conditioning-conditioned relationship to a kind of ‘meta-power’ 
which is structured essentially round a certain number of prohibition functions; but this 
meta-power with its prohibitions can only take hold and secure its footing where it is 
rooted in a whole series of multiple and indefinite power relations that supply the 
necessary basis for the great negative forms of power.’ (Foucault as cited in Gordon 
1980: 122)   
 
The asymmetric power relationship that the state has over its citizens is problematic for those who want to 
enact resistance. Krotosynski (1990) claims that in free societies the government is selected by the people 
from a range of candidates and therefore the issue of privacy rights (or lack thereof), as enacted by 
government, could be seen as an indirect measure of society’s commitment to liberty and, in a broader 
sense, to autonomy. However, to really make this choice the citizen needs to have access to a high level of 
transparency of state action. Such transparency, although very desirable for the citizen, is not necessarily 
in the interest of governments since, as Lyon (2007) highlights, the more subtle the surveillance regime 
the more likely it is to have the desired effect.  One could therefore argue that one important element of 
resistance—one which will enable real choices in the democratic process—lies in the ability of different 
actors to make visible the variety of state surveillance practices and the connections between such 
practices.  Indeed, a lack of such accountability was one of several antecedent factors attributed to the 
UK’s rating an ‘endemic surveillance state’ (Privacy International 2006), especially in the areas of 
constitutional protection, identity cards, biometrics, data-sharing and, communications interception 
(2007).  
 
Technology and information processing often act as an intersecting layer between the ‘body’ and the 
‘state’, which can be witnessed in most public sector organisations, through for example ID cards, medical 
histories, driving licences, passports and more recently biometric scanning in schools (in the UK). Under 
state protection principles giving up one’s personal data is not only advised, it is indeed compulsory 
(Haggerty and Ericson 2006).  Although several countries have legislation in place to prevent the sharing 
of data across internal state departments,7 once the data has been collected there is no guarantee of its 
future use (Raab 2003). Furthermore, knowledge discovery technology in large databases (KDD) is a 
growing problem for normative privacy (Tavani 1999). We also know that the larger the data set the 
higher the probability of inaccurate or erroneous data. These databases often have unique identifiers, for 
example a National Insurance number or NHS number, that can be use to facilitate the process of 
performing relational queries with other databases, thereby establishing connections and the building up of 
what Roger Clark calls the ‘digital persona,’ with associated ‘dataveillance’ practices (Clark 1994). This is 
one of the reasons why the national ID card is facing such strong opposition in the UK. In the proposed 
system a National ID number would act as a master key to link and unlock all data across all government 
databases. Liberty’s research into ‘Surveillance and Personal Privacy in Modern Britain’ showed that the 
British people’s faith in government data handling practice is dwindling. In a YouGov Poll, commissioned 
by Liberty in 2007, ‘54 per cent of those questioned did not trust the government and other public sector 
authorities to keep their personal information completely confidential’. When it comes to state 
surveillance we seem to see two opposing trends. On the one hand we see the rapid expansion of state 
surveillance of citizens activities (often under the seemingly legitimate need of security or more efficient 
government) and on the other had we see the decline of citizens trust in the ability of governments to 
secure the data collected—especially if this data is in an electronic format. 
 
                                                     
7 In America the Total Information Awareness (TIA) Project was disbanded in 2001 following civil liberties campaigns. 
However similar projects continue to be implemented elsewhere for example the Golden Shield Project in China where laws are 
less restrictive on the collation of personal data.  
Introna and Gibbons: Networks and Resistance 
Surveillance & Society 6(3) 238
Nearly every major government department has experienced some form of public data loss in recent 
months; at the time of writing this paper the UK Home Office had just admitted to the loss of some 84,000 
criminal records, stored on a memory stick by the firm PA Consulting, during a research project8. This is 
the latest in a series of public failures; in November 2007 two discs containing the records of every child 
benefit claimant were lost in the UK9 and an employee of the US Department of Veteran Affairs’ laptop 
was stolen, containing the records of 26.5 million veterans, including their social security numbers and, in 
some cases, disability ratings10. Research conducted by the Telegraph11 reported 37 million items of 
personal data had been lost in 2007 by government officials. The ACLU report ‘Bigger Monster, Weaker 
Chains’ examined the American ‘surveillance society’, specifically the dangers of commercially collected 
data being obtained through government channels; “although the Privacy Act of 1974 banned the 
government from maintaining information on citizens who are not targets of investigations, the FBI can 
now evade that requirement by simply purchasing information that has been collected by the private 
sector.” (ACLU 2003:8).  Kerr (2007) argues that society is rapidly moving away from retributive 
justice, based on the redistribution of wealth and punishing wrongdoers, to actuarial justice where the state 
uses profiles, statistics and behavioural predictors to assess risk, generate suspicion and pre-empt threats to 
safety. These invisible processes of classification, codification and categorisation (Suchman 1994) into a 
‘digital persona’—which acts as a true yet digital representation of the actual self—“does not determine a 
person’s actions; it [merely] provides the space of action which one can move” Winograd (1994). 
 
In response to the legitimate concerns of citizens some institutional mechanisms have been created such as 
Information and Surveillance Commissioners. These bodies are supposed to create some symmetry of 
power between the state and the citizen. They are, however, often seen as too close to government to be an 
effective mechanism of resistance.  Another, generally accepted, mechanism of resistance is the use of 
advocacy groups (Bennett 2008). Indeed historically advocacy and pressure groups have long proved 
useful in mediating civil issues with governments, for example the abolition of slavery and woman 
suffrage (Keck and Sikkink 1998). A European Commission (EC) paper on building stronger partnerships 
with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) argues for a stronger role for advocacy NGOs whose 
‘primary aim is to influence the policies of public authorities and public opinion in general’ (European 
Commission 2000:4). It is this work of privacy advocates who perform the function of advocacy NGOs, 
within the domain of state surveillance, which is our concern here.  
 
In his book “The Privacy Advocates” Colin Bennett (2008, 59) makes the case for an active and vibrant 
network of privacy advocates. He argues that although there is a network this network is “dynamic, 
volatile, overlapping, fragmented and somewhat elusive”. He further suggests that there is “certainly no 
clear structure…neither is there a social movement with an identifiable base…perhaps [there is] an 
‘advocacy network,’ which can be conceptualised not as a fixed structure, but as a series of concentric 
circles.”   It is this network, in as much as it can be said to exist, that our research wants to identify and 
attempt to reveal. It is our claim that such a virtual network may be a powerful actor through the 
enactment of information politics12 in particular.  The success of such as network’s information 
politics—i.e. ability to generate politically relevant information and move it by the most effective means 
to the place where it will have the most impact, at the most critical time—will in part be facilitated by the 
cohesiveness and density of the network as well as how this network interconnects with other relevant 
                                                     
8 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7575989.stm (accessed November 2, 2008) 
9 See http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/jun/26/whitehall.children (accessed November 2, 2008) 
10 See http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2007/11/20/228208/us-department-of-veteran-affairs-in-yet-another-data.htm 
(accessed November 2, 2008) 
11  See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/1574687/Government's-record-year-of-data-loss.html (accessed 
November 2, 2008) 
12 Bennett (2008, 96) suggests, with reference to the work of Keck and Sikkink (1998), that advocacy groups engage in a 
fourfold typology of tactics: information politics, symbolic politics, accountability politics and leverage politics. We would 
suggest that advocacy networks on the internet is particularly important for information politics (although it obviously does not 
exclude the other forms of tactics)   
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actors such as information and surveillance commissioners, traditional media, new media, researchers and 
so forth. It is our proposition that an effective enactment of information politics by the network will be an 
essential constitutive element of a meta-surveillance network, which in turn is an important element of 
resisting state surveillance practices. This will be the focus of our network analysis in the sections that 
follow.  
 
On the constitution (or not) of an online advocacy network 
 
This paper proposes to use the principles of social network analysis (and network principles more 
generally) to explore the manner in which it can be said that online advocates do constitute a more or less 
cohesive network (which may function as a viable mode for resisting state surveillance) and to show how 
this network relates to a wider network of intermediaries that they rely on to disseminate their information, 
i.e. to enact their information politics. In the subsections that follow we outline our methodology and the 
initial research conducted into the network of privacy advocates, which was done using publicly available 
web crawling applications (i.e. SocSciBot13 and IssueCrawler14).  
 
Social network and webometric analysis as a methodology  
Social network analysis (SNA) has been used in various disciplines to analyse the interactions between 
different groups or sub-groups of society. For example it has been used to study communication networks 
in organisations, the diffusion of innovation, informal collaborations in research groups, and so forth 
(Freeman 2004). Through SNA it is possible to get a sense of certain group or network characteristics 
such as: the cohesiveness of a group, who the central actors are, who are on the periphery, and so forth.  
Traditionally SNA is done by collecting data through interviews with the relevant actors or by compiling 
data from public sources about relationships (such as equity ownership between different companies). 
Increasingly SNA methods are also being used to investigate the relationships between internet actors 
(websites, web pages, etc) using publically available hyperlink data. This is referred to as ‘webometric’ 
methods. Webometric based studies have focused on a variety of topics such as: the performance of search 
engines (e.g. Courtois and Berry 1999; Hawking et al 2001; Thelwall 2000; Thelwall 2002; Vaughan and 
Thelwall 2004); the mapping of (issue) networks (e.g. Garrido and Halavais 2003; Garton et al 1997; 
Rogers 2004; Rogers and Marres 2000; Van den Bos 2006; Wormell 2000), the mapping of blogs and 
social networking (Adamic and Glance 2005; Hargittai 2007; Lin and Halavais 2004; Thelwall 2007a; 
Thelwall 2007b; Thelwall and Hellsten 2006), and so forth.   
 
All of these studies have one assumption in common. They all assume that hyperlinks are contextually 
meaningful or socially significant in some way or another i.e. that a link is not merely a pointer that 
simply happens to refer to a computer address (or IP address) somewhere in cyberspace. They all assume 
that there are, more or less, significant reasons why authors create links between themselves and other 
nodes (or actors) on the Web.  Foot et al (2003) suggests that “actors on the web acknowledge other 
actors by linking to them” and as Rogers claims “non-linking is a form of non-recognition and is an act of 
silencing through [such] non-recognition” (as cited in Foot et al 2003). Thus, through the creation of links 
relevance, recognition and acknowledgment are often enacted. Obviously, not all links function in this 
way and some are indeed done for rather more trivial or instrumental reasons, such as trying to improve 
search engine ranking.  However, when a large amount of links accumulate between actors it can no 
longer be dismissed as insignificant. Indeed linking patterns and link counts are the fundamental basis 
upon which the issue of relevance is decided by the Google search engine (Introna and Nissenbaum 2000). 
Given the success of the search engine, based on these link patterns, one can reasonably claim that context 
sensitive link patterns can legitimately form the basis for a SNA—i.e. they do in some way designate 
contextually meaningful relationships rather than random or trivial links. If this is the case then one must 
still answer the question about what can be known from such an network analysis of linking patterns and, 
                                                     
13 http://socscibot.wlv.ac.uk  (accessed November 1, 2008) 
14 IssueCrawler.net. http://www.govcom.org/Issuecrawler_instructions.htm  (accessed March 10, 2000). 
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furthermore, how might one go about doing it. We will take up the first part of the question when we do 
the analysis below. In response to the second part of the question we will propose a methodology for 
doing the analysis which is partly based on the work of Hsu (2008).  
 
As indicated above, the central question that informs this research is whether online advocacy groups 
concerned with state surveillance can be said to constitute an emergent network of meta-surveillance, 
which can, through information politics, act as a possible mechanism for resisting state surveillance 
practices.  A first step to answering this question is to understand how, if at all, this online network is 
constituted.  Who are the actors in this network, how dense is the network, how do they interconnect 
(who are central, who are on the periphery), and so forth.   A subsequent step in the research would be to 
analyse traffic as well as more in-depth interviews with different actors in the advocacy network.  One 
might also track and analyse how major incidents get absorbed and communicated through the network, 
and more. The initial research reported here aims, as a first step in this project, to reveal links between 
advocate groups including any ‘intermediaries’ they may use to relay their information and messages.   
 
In trying to make this online network visible, or analysing any network for that matter, a key question is to 
establish a methodology to draw appropriate boundaries of the sub-network. At one end of the spectrum 
the whole internet is the network since every actor is connected to every other actor even if it is through 
massive degrees of separation. On the other end of the spectrum is a network that consists only of one 
actor and all those that are directly connected to it. Clearly these two extremes are not helpful ways of 
drawing appropriate boundaries. In order to solve this problem the research needs a more or less rigorous 
methodology to decide who is part of the network, who is not, and why? In other words such network 
research needs to have a methodology for drawing network boundaries in a meaningful and appropriate 
way.  In traditional SNA one would ask the actors where the boundaries are. How would one do this in a 
webometrics analysis? 
 
Establishing the network boundaries: the initial actor selection process 
Eight, well-known, privacy and surveillance centric sites (the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU); 
Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion And Numbering (CASPIAN), the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF), the Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC); Liberty; Orwell Awards; Statewatch 
and the Surveillance Studies Network) were used as the initial pilot sites, or staring points, for the research 
using an actor-centric (also known as the ego-centric) approach. This entailed each actor being crawled, in 
turn, to determine the sites that they linked to, drawing comparators with other sites to reveal those core 
(densely linked to) sites in the network. These pilot crawls proved useful however there was a likelihood 
that they only represented a certain proportion of the network, which were based on popular privacy and 
surveillance reports and news items. We were also aware of other interesting forms of electronic advocacy 
that did not entail the publishing of reports as such.15   
 
As mentioned, for the crawls we used SocSciBot and IssueCrawler and their affiliate programs UCInet16 
and Pajek17. SocSciBot (Social Science Bot) is a custom crawler developed by Mike Thelwall, of 
Wolverhampton University, which provides the user with a vast amount of detail of the individual 
structures of sites, including all page content. For the second, more exploratory task of revealing the 
network (the overall network and sub-networks) a crawler called IssueCrawler, devised by Richard 
Rogers and the govcom.org foundation, was used (to be discussed below). This tool provides the 
functionality of not only looking at the initial sites provided but also looking at the sites that they link to, 
                                                     
15 An example of this is the Tracking Transience website.  Developed by Hasan Elahi, an Assistant Professor and media artist, 
this is an example of an extreme act of sousveillance, by a man who was once mistakenly listed on a terrorist watch list. Since 
then he has turned his private life inside out by placing a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device in his mobile phone 
so that he is instantly locatable, via Google, 24/7 and as a means of verifying his existence, posts images to his website of his 
surroundings on a regular basis. 
16 http://www.analytic.com (accessed November 1, 2008) 
17 http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/pub/networks/pajek/doc/pajekman.htm (accessed November 1, 2008) 
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and where they link to, ultimately creating a network based on cross-referencing and link density.18 
Therefore, if an important actor had been missed in the initial selection process (which was based on data 
collated from the pilot sites) then this crawler would extrapolate to those missing nodes and fill in the 
blanks, so to speak. A detailed flow diagram of the actor selection process can be found in Appendix 1. 
The govcom.org website, home of the IssueCrawler, provides recommendations for establishing the initial 
core set of actors to use to ascertain a particular ‘issue network’ as they call it:19 
 
1. Use a search engine such as Google and use the top ten or twenty results. Also use any contacts or 
‘experts’ within the field, details from newspaper articles, a particular organization’s website with 
recommended links and any other recommendations to gather an initial list of useful websites. In this 
case a keyword search was conducted through Google resulting in approximately 295 actors.  
2. Avoid using big media sites and big portals as they have links to a wider range of sites, not all of 
which will be relevant and ‘do not produce ‘networks.’ We only included sites that had clear messages 
regarding state surveillance. There are examples of advocates that were not used, because their focus 
was on other human rights issues, for example Amnesty International.  
3. Find the relevant page on a website and use that as a starting point i.e. the ones that pertain 
specifically to the issue under investigation: This step was changed slightly due to the vast network 
and sub-networks being dealt with (approximately 57,594 links for the external link count and a 
further 880 from the Google search, before filtering). We had to balance the aim of wanting all 
relevant sites and a need to focus on those that had the issue of state surveillance as a core focus.  
4. Deleting duplicates: this was perhaps the most time consuming task. The 2,803 links (returned from 
Google and pilot tests20) were stripped back to their domain name for categorisation. Duplicates were 
deleted a total of three times over the course of the filtration process.  
 
The basic principle of the approach used here is to allow the actors to indicate the relevant actors and 
boundaries of the network through their linking patterns.  By using a system of ongoing cross-
referencing the crawlers progressively include actors, for subsequent crawls, which have multiple links 
from already known actors. This iterative process is continued until no new actors emerge. The success of 
this methodology is obviously dependent of very carefully selected starting points (hence our careful 
selection of the initial starting points in this step).   
 
Refining and revealing the advocacy network through sociograms  
Using our key actors, established in the previous step, as starting points IssueCrawler was set up to run at 
frequent intervals. The research was conducted over a period of four months, a crawl being conducted 
every fortnight21. This was done for two reasons: first, we wanted to determine the stability of the network 
and, second, we wanted to see whether specific state surveillance incidents were reflected in the link 
activity of the network.  The crawl itself is not aggressive i.e. it does not constitute an unnecessary 
workload on the servers of the sites being crawled (Thelwall and Stuart 2006) and we ensured the actors 
crawled were relevant, to reduce waste. This is an important consideration for this type of research.  
 
In using IssueCrawler the proportion of new actors in the network, those not already established in the 
initial filtration process described above, was 46%22. This suggests that one can have reasonable 
                                                     
18 This has predominantly been close to 100 links, usually averaging around 95 links which does pose the question for social 
network analysis more generally of if this is a common denominator when it comes to link count.  
19 These have been adapted from the original website - http://www.govcom.org/Issuecrawler_instructions.htm (accessed 
November 3, 2008) 
20 To try to ensure that only relevant sites were included in the ‘harvest’, only those ‘actors’ with a link count of two (2) or 
more were included in the process.   
21 The crawls were conducted fortnightly between the 2nd August and 8th November 2008. Further research is being undertaken 
at present to analyse this data temporally to ascertain any difference. The crawls are scheduled to continue fortnightly until 3rd 
January 2009 to allow 6 months data collation. 
22 This includes actors in the core and periphery of the network, as described later in the paper 
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confidence in using a combination of Google (a commercial search engine) and SocSciBot (a private 
crawler) in determining relevant network actors for a given criteria, as was done in the first step.  As 
previously stated the IssueCrawler application works by ‘harvesting’ the sites given to it by the user, then 
analysing those links, as well as the links in those sites to other sites and so on, all the while cumulating 
the number of links till it comes full circle and determine the most prominent actors. In other words 
membership of the network—i.e. the boundaries—are determined by the context sensitive links or 
references provided by the actors themselves.  Through this process of cross-referencing (and link 
density criteria) IssueCrawler provides its list of network members. We would suggest that the 
triangulation between Google, SocSciBot and IssueCrawler provides one with a fairly robust 
methodology, for actor selection in determining the boundaries of the network—given a certain link 
density threshold. At the end of this selection process the advocacy network comprised of 128 intermittent 
actors, 74 regular actors and 35 new actors (these are listed in Appendix 2). So far in our IssueCrawler 
crawls completed 26% of the originally selected actors have appeared in the network as reflected in the 
network diagrams below (19 on the first crawl on 2nd August and 2 more on 30th August). No further 
actors from the initial list have appeared since then suggesting a certain level of network stability. We will 
discuss this in more detail in our analysis below. 
 
In order to understand how the actors, who are members of the network, relate we need to do some further 
analysis. These interrelationships can be represented through a number of SNA metrices such as density, 
centrality, clusters, bridges, and so forth.  In this paper we will not do a complete SNA (this is beyond 
the scope of the paper).  Rather we will use sociograms generated by IssueCrawler to provide an initial 
representation of the interrelationships of the network. We must keep in mind that a crawl is in a sense a 
‘snapshot’ of the network at particular point in time. For example if we look as Figure 1 (the sociogram 
for the crawl of the 2nd of August 2008) we can note the following. First, in these diagrams the centrality 
of an actor is indicated by the relative size of the circle in the diagram.   The centrality of the actor is a 
direct reflection of their link density (or influence one might say) within the network both internally and 
externally to other actors.  In Figure 1 privacyinternational.org is indicated as the most central actor in 
the network.  Second, IssueCrawler categorises actors according to top-level domain name. For example 
in Figure 1 all .org sites are indicated in grey and all .com sites are indicated in green. Unfortunately the 
user does not control this categorisation process. Third, in the diagram we see which actors are connected 
with which other actors (given a certain density threshold). These links also indicate direction. In the 
diagram we see a list of actors below the heading “Links from the network”. These are actors who received 
links from the actors in the network and those below the heading “Links to the network” are those actors 
who link to other actors in the network.23  As mentioned earlier, a complete listing of the actors (based 
on their domain name as indicated in the sociogram) is provided in Appendix 2. With this basic 
information to hand we can now do an analysis of the different crawls from IssueCrawler, as indicated 
below.   
 
A tentative analysis of some network crawls   
Let us first consider the sociogram that resulted from the network crawl of the 2nd of August 2008 
(indicated in Figure 1). We first note that privacyinternational.org is the most central actor. This is not 
surprising given the prominence of the actor in a variety of campaigns against state surveillance (such as 
the ID card campaign for example).24  Other significant actors are, for example, the Electronic Privacy 
Information Centre (epic.org), the Electronic Frontier Foundation (eff.org) and statewatch.org.  All of 
these are to be expected. Some more unexpected actors (in terms of prominence) are European Digital 
Rights (edri.org), the Foundation for Information Policy Research (fipr.org) and the United Nations 
(un.org).   
                                                     
23 More information on the structure of the maps can be found on the IssueCrawler FAQ site: 
http://wiki.issuecrawler.net/Issuecrawler/FAQ#What_are_links_from_the_network (accessed November 2, 2008) 
24 Privacy International have conducted a series of studies into this area and in 2004 produced an interim report entitled 
‘Mistaken Identity; Exploring the Relationship Between National Identity Cards & the Prevention of Terrorism’. 
http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/idcard/uk/id-terrorism.pdf (accessed November 3, 2008) 
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Figure 1: Sociogram – 2 August 2008 
 
From the diagram (and the ‘links to’ and the ‘links from’ lists) it seems that there is a high level of co-
linking (i.e. cohesiveness) between the advocacy sub-networks (designated with the .org domain). In 
contrast the co-linking between advocacy groups and the traditional media is relatively lower than one 
would have expected.  Linking from advocacy groups to the traditional media would probably be driven 
by reporting around specific incidents. The lack of linking from traditional media to advocacy groups 
(with the exception of Wired Magazine) might be because the traditional media see new media as 
competition.  Given the prominence of the traditional media (especially for the off-line audience) it 
seems important that the advocacy groups find a way to cultivate co-linking relationships with the 
traditional media in order to draw them into the network. 
 
Another interesting feature of the network is the relationship between advocacy groups and social media 
(such as MySpace, Facebook, YouTube, etc.). There again seems to be limited co-linking between 
advocacy actors and social media. One would expect that since this media is not subject to the same 
editorial and journalistic control that there would be a much higher level of co-linking. There are a number 
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of other interesting observations one might make with regard to this particular diagram.  We will pick 




Figure 2: Sociogram - 30th August 2008 
 
The network crawl of 30th of August 2008 (indicated in Figure 2) is perhaps one of the more interesting 
sociogram of the crawls so far, as noted by the higher density of advocacy organisations (depicted by the 
light grey circles in this diagram).  A prominent actor, which had not featured in the network previously, 
was the UK based Guardian newspaper. At the time that the crawl was conducted newspapers in the UK 
had reported on two major data protection incidents. The first of these were government discs containing 
the names of thousands of convicted criminals and discussions centred on compensation. The second was 
yet another incident of data being on a stolen laptop computer. It seems that this is just the tip of the 
iceberg in the number of similar incidents, which seem to have become media fodder in recent months. 
Undoubtedly the catalyst for the media interest was the widely condemned loss of computer discs by Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Custom’s (HMRC) office containing the details of every child benefit claimant 
including personal data such as address, name and child’s name. The discs, which have not yet been 
recovered, were lost in transit and had been given to a junior employee to send by mail service. The data 
on the discs were not encrypted. This sparked a national outcry into the safety of data stored by 
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government institutions and even the Information Commissioner capitalized on the opportunity to stress 
the need for tighter security measures.  
 
 
Figure 3: 11th October Sociogram 
 
As we develop our methodology we would want to track major incidents through the network. This means 
that we would need to collect data on a sufficiently regular basis or use the Internet Archive25 as a source 
(although this might be somewhat problematic since the archive appears to store information almost two 
months after it had originally been posted). 
  
If we look at Figure 2 we also see the Ontario Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner 
(ipc.on.ca) and the Information Commissioner's Office of the UK (ico.gov.uk) included in the network.  
These are independent ‘watchdog’ organisations that are there to ensure that the rights of individuals are 
protected.  The co-linking between them and the advocacy organisations are interesting since one might 
argue that they can act as possible intermediaries for information flow between the advocacy groups and 
state institutions.   
                                                     
25 http://www.archive.org/index.php  
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The sociogram of 11th October 2008 (in Figure 3) highlighted a strong state presence in the network. Two, 
out of the three new actors that appeared in the network were classified as state actors; the UK Ministry of 
Justice (justice.gov.uk) and the US Department of Justice (us.doj.gov). In some cases, IssueCrawler 
retrieves the exact URL that was being linked to within the network. This is not always possible and in 
these instances only the home page of the site is given. In this network, however, there were a number of 
specific links, mainly on government and news web pages.  The central issue around this time appears to 
be ID cards, predominantly in the United Kingdom (UK) and in the United States of America (USA). 
 
This is the issue that appears dominant, due to the unusual retrieval of several direct links and therefore we 
are making a supposition that the overall intentionality of the network that day was to inform the public 
about ID cards, at a time when it was being discussed publicly. To further support that claim we 
researched the issues around the time and a simple Google search demonstrated the publicity of the ID 
cards issue, in August, so it is not surprising that this was linked to by several advocate sites.26 The most 
highly ranked of these was the EPIC National and Real ID Act, which also appeared in the network (as 
seen in Figure 3). A couple of examples of specific sites that were returned, which were made visible by 
IssueCrawler, were Realnightmare.org’s page on Anti-Real ID Legislation in the States27 and EPIC’s 
National ID Cards and Real ID Act28 and both the Federal Trade Commission’s and Ministry of Defence 
offering guidelines on how to fight back against ID theft.29 Interestingly a story from the USA Today on 
an NSA call database, which appeared in the 30th August crawl, a date when the network was unusually 
shifted towards advocacy sites, was also retrieved in this crawl.30 Again, as we develop our methodology 
we would want to track issues in the way they reconfigure the network relationships (both temporarily and 
over a period of time). 
 
Other aspects of the network’s linking patterns 
In this sub-section we will explore some further features of the network and discuss the way in which 
these may add to or detract from the network becoming a cohesive, global network on issues of 
surveillance and privacy.  
 
The periphery. As previously stated, the page and site analyses that IssueCrawler provides are only the 
details of reciprocal links between actors. We were also interested to establish the actors which were on 
the periphery (those who are linked to but do not return a link to the host site). In order to do this we 
exported all the raw data to an affiliate application called UCINet. We were then able to view all the links 
in the network and cross compare the list of actors IssueCrawler had retrieved against the whole list, those 
that remained were the periphery actors. A total of 68 actors were classed as peripheral, over the course of 
all the crawls we conducted between the 2nd August and 8th November 2008. Some of these have had 
reciprocal relationships in the network and as such have only appeared on the periphery a small number of 
times. We were particularly interested in the actors who have not yet been recognised by the core. Twenty 
six (26) of the actors, in the periphery, were in the initial list of actors we categorised as privacy 
advocates, including actors such as NSA Watch, the Surveillance Studies Network, ALCEI (Electronic 
Frontiers, Italy) and Wikileaks. The first three appeared in all 9 crawls and Wikileaks appeared in 8.  It is 
                                                     
26 Examples include ‘ID Plan in Crisis after Guinea Pig Workers Revolt’ 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/oct/12/idcards (accessed November 3, 2008), the Independent’s Letter’s page 
http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/letters/letters-id-cards-954482.html (accessed 3 November, 2008) and biometric 
fingerprinting in US schools http://www.cr80news.com/2008/08/18/schools-replacing-photo-id-cards-with-biometrics (accessed 
November 3, 2008) 
27 See http://www.realnightmare.org/news/105; http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv: Anti-Real ID Legislation in the States 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/reviews/datasharing-intro.htm (accessed November 3, 2008) 
28 See http://epic.org/privacy/id-cards (accessed November 3, 2008) 
29 See http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/ (accessed November 3, 2008) 
30 http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm (accessed November 2, 2008) 
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therefore puzzling why these actors have not yet received links from the core (i.e. not appeared in any of 
the sociograms). Why are the actors in the core not linking to them? Clearly it would be in the interest of 
the network to draw these relevant actors into the core. This would reduce the degrees of separation and 
add to the value of the entire network, thereby increasing the probability that the network can become a 
more effective vehicle for information politics, meta-surveillance and possibly resistance.  
 
Affiliate actors. Many of the sites in the network are specific information sites set up by advocate groups. 
Others are collaborations between advocacy groups, demonstrating an acknowledgment of the mutual 
benefits available to the network of sharing information, knowledge and expertise. Examples include 
dataretentionisnosolution.com, a petition site against the plans of the UK government to store all 
telephone and internet traffic data. This site was set up by Digital Civil Rights in Europe (EDRI) in 2005 
and we may well see a revival of the site in the network given the current prominence of this issue in the 
UK media. Other examples include tor.eff.org (a software project to defend against traffic analysis), 
spychips.com (petitioning against the use of RFID) and realnightmare.org (campaigning against the Real 
ID Act of 2005), affiliates of the EFF, CASPIAN and the ACLU respectively.   
 
What is interesting to note is that because these affiliate actors feature independently in the network they 
are afforded a more influential status, within the network as a whole, since they are accessible from 
multiple points within the network—i.e. there are less degrees of freedom to get to them from the core. It 
seems that the cultivation of links through affiliate actors has the potential to strengthen the position of the 
core actors in the network.  It will also strengthen the position of sites in the periphery that they may link 
to.  
 
Geography. IssueCrawler has a series of affiliated tools for analytical purposes. One of these tools is Issue 
Geographer, which returns a geographic analysis of actors’ base locations in the real world (based on 
where the domain name is registered, which is obviously not entirely accurate). In conjunction with the 
tool (on average the tool only returns approximately a fifth of the base locations in this network) we 
conducted an online analysis of the actors’ base locations and found the following results:  
 
Amsterdam (1); Australia (1); Austria (2); Belgium (5); California (15); Finland (1); 
France (3); Germany (6); Illinois (3), Massachusetts (2); New Jersey (2); New York (10); 
Ontario (2); Portugal (1); Rhode Island (2); Switzerland (1); Tennessee (1); UK (20); 
unknown (14); US (3) (state unknown) Virginia (6); Washington (1) Washington DC 
(25); Wyoming (1). 
 
The data indicates a strong western bias (indeed North America (55%) and UK (16%) bias), which could 
be for a number of reasons. There could be a language barrier between English and non-English speaking 
sites, legislation in certain countries may restrict freedom of speech or there may be actors who, out of a 
desire to remain anonymous, would mask their location. Of course, statistically North America and 
Europe are higher overall users of the Internet31 than the other areas mentioned. Nevertheless, this is an 
issue that the advocacy network may want to consider. 
 
Some conclusions and future work 
 
The aim of this paper was to do an initial exploration as to whether the actors concerned with state 
surveillance can be said to constitute a network of resistance through the mechanisms of information 
politics and meta-surveillance. It was argued that such a network based on the mechanisms of information 
politics and meta-surveillance might be the one of the effective means for citizen to resist state 
surveillance.  The question then becomes one of whether such a network exists and to what extent it is 
(or can be) a coherent and cohesive system for information politics and meta-surveillance? In order to 
                                                     
31 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (accessed November 3 2008) 
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evaluate such a proposition we used the principles of social network analysis and the small world 
hypothesis, as well as a variety of web-based tools to perform a webometric network analysis of the 
advocacy network. The intention was to establish if there was indeed a network and what the 
characteristics of such a network would be. From our data collection and analysis we can provide the 
following tentative conclusions. 
 
 There seems to be a relatively stable network of core actors. These are the actors one would expect to 
find such as Privacy International (privacyinternational.org), Electronic Privacy Information Centre 
(epic.org), the Electronic Frontier Foundation (eff.org) and Statewatch.org.  However, there are a 
number of important actors that seem to remain on the periphery of the network. This seems to detract 
from the potential of the network to become an effective system for information politics and meta-
surveillance.  
 The density of the network is relatively low. This means that there is a relatively low level of 
reciprocal linking between all the actors in the network. Reciprocal linking draws actors into the 
network (i.e. reduces the degrees of separation) and increases the positive network externalities for all 
the actors in the network.  
 It seems that the network is not yet able to effectively link to the traditional or new media as 
intermediaries. Enrolling the traditional media as well as the new media into the network (at least 
around certain important events) is important for the ‘reach’ of the network, and is especially 
important for effective information politics.  
 The network is highly biased and skewed towards the west (North America and the UK in particular). 
This must clearly be a matter of concern since state surveillance practices are increasingly global.   
 
Our overall, and tentative, conclusion would be that the advocacy network still seems somewhat 
fragmented with a relatively small, and geographically biased, core. This seems to concur with Bennett’s 
(2008) claim that the advocacy network is “dynamic, volatile, overlapping, fragmented and somewhat 
elusive,” without a clear structure, nor an identifiable base.  However, it could be argued—from the point 
of network theory—that the network will be more effective in its information politics if it is more 
cohesive, at least in the way it links to each other in the online environment.  By reducing the degrees of 
separation the network can foster links between different data sets, create links between information about 
incidents, corroborate information (making it more credible), and so forth. This is especially true if the 
network can succeed to enrol important intermediaries such as the traditional media, the new social media, 
commissioners, researchers, etc. into the network. If successful it might ultimately become a network of 
meta-surveillance that has the potential to transcend the individual actor’s agency into a system of 
collective awareness of state-surveillance practices. Such collective awareness can most certainly become 
a powerful form of resistance. On the other hand it might be argued that it is important to the survival of 
the network that it remains ‘dynamic, volatile, overlapping, fragmented and somewhat elusive’ (as 
suggested by Bennett, 2008); a network of loosely connected centres that might be more resilient and able 
to resist attempts to counteract its activities. This is an issue to explore with the actors involved in 
subsequent qualitative interviews.  
 
As mentioned before, this is an ongoing research project. We acknowledge that there is a limit to what one 
might be able to conclude from the type of link data that we have collected. The issues mentioned above 
are best explained by the actors themselves, in order to perform a more comparative analysis between the 
online activities and offline activities. It would also be interesting to see the role that the actors consider 
themselves to play in this online environment, especially with regard to their intentions in relation to the 
network as a whole. We intend to conduct a series of qualitative interviews, with the actors in the network. 
The results of our network analysis will be shown to each of the actors, including their individual data and 
how they are positioned in the broader network.  
 
However, in order to make the support for our hypothesis more robust we believe we need to triangulate 
our network analysis and qualitative interviews with a third data set. We would suggest that to form a true 
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representation of the network effects we need to make transparent all links which are being made to the 
network actors, not just the visible ones (the online hyperlinks, public reporting and campaigning) but also 
the invisible ones. Analysing traffic log data and the IP addresses of visitors to the advocacy network’s 
sites will fulfil this function. This will give us a more comprehensive indication of reciprocity between 
non-state and state actors and the extent to which the network is effective in its information politics and its 
overall intention to resist state surveillance. This paper is a tentative step towards a better understanding of 
the potential of the new media to develop a system of meta-surveillance as an organic and continually 
emerging mode of resistance to state surveillance. We believe it has made a start towards such an 
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Appendix II: Details of the Network Actors 
 
 
Please note that the descriptions used below are based on the taglines of the websites, not on the opinions 
of the authors. The location and contact details are a rough approximation of the location of the actors. 
Categories are used to demonstrate the range of actors in the network. The IssueCrawler application 
categorises the actors based on domain name for example .org or .com. Please note that by categorizing an 
actor as an advocate in this table we are not implying that the actor is a privacy advocate. Several actors 
that appear in the network are primarily campaigning for other human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for example abolition of the death penalty. 
 
 
Web Addresses of 
Actors 
Full Name and 
Description of Actor 
Category  
(NSA = Non 
State Actor/ SA 





abcnews.go.com ABC News News/Media 
(NSA)
25/10/2008 California 
accessreports.com  Access Reports, 
Freedom of Information 











02/08/2008 New York, New 
York 




02/08/2008 New York, New 
York 





02/08/2008 Princeton, New 
Jersey 
ael.be Association Electronique 
Libre (AEL)  
Advocate 
(NSA)
16/08/2008 Wanze, Belgium 
aktiv.org Adult Search Engine Adult Website 
(NSA)
25/10/2008 Unknown 




02/08/2008 Chicago, Illinois 
amnesty.org  Amnesty International Advocate 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 London, UK 
andrebacard.com  Author André Bacard’s 
“Facts, Fables & Foibles”
Education 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 Only listed e-
mail address




02/08/2008 San Diego, 
California 




02/08/2008 Only listed e-
mail address




02/08/2008 London, UK 
archive.org  Internet Archive Reference 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 San Francisco 
article19.org  Article 19: Global 




02/08/2008 London, UK 
ask.com Ask.com: Search Engine Search Engine 
(NSA)
16/08/2008 London, UK 




02/08/2008 Wien, Austria 
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bigbrotherawards.eu.or
g  




16/08/2008 Paris, France 




02/08/2008 Vienna, Austria 
bof.nl  Bits of Freedom Advocate 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 Amsterdam 
boingboing.net Boing Boing: A Directory 
of Wonderful Things
Blog (NSA) 02/08/2008 Sherman Oaks, 
California 
cato.org  The CATO Institute Research 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 Washington, DC 





02/08/2008 Trumsburg, New 
York 




16/08/2008 Berlin, Germany 





02/08/2008 Washington DC 




02/08/2008 London, UK 
cfp2005.org Computers Freedom 




02/08/2008 Seattle – 
location 
changed to  
Washington DC 
for 2009 
cippic.ca Canadian Internet Policy 





cme.org The Christian Methodist 
Episcopal 
Religious (NSA) 30/08/2008 Memphis, 
Tennessee  





08/11/08 Washington D.C 
consumer.gov Consumer.gov: Your 
resource for consumer 




30/08/2008 e-mail address 
only 
consumer-action.org  Consumer Action  Advocacy and 
Education 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 Washington DC 





30/08/2008 Washington, DC 










02/08/2008 London, UK 




11/08/2008 e-mail address 
only 
creativecommons.org Creative Commons  Charitable 
Corporation 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 San Francisco, 
California 
cryptome.org Cryptome: posts official 
secrets document to the 







16/10/2008 Leeds, UK 
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cyber.law.harvard.edu Berkman Centre for 






cyber-rights.org Cyber-Rights & Cyber-









Data Retention Is No 
Solution 
EDRI 02/08/2008 See EDRI 











02/08/2008 Washington, DC 




11/08/2008 Washington DC 




02/08/2008 e-mail address 
only 
digitalconsumer.org  DigitalConusmer.org: 
Protecting fair-use rights 















02/08/2008 North Adelaide, 
Australia 




02/08/2008 San Francisco, 
California 




02/08/2008 Helsinki, Finland 




02/08/2008 Washington DC 
facebook.com  Facebook Social 
Networking Site 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 Palo Alto, 
California 




02/08/2008 Washington, DC 




11/10/2008 Washington, DC 











02/08/2008 Cambridge, UK 




EDRI (NSA) 02/08/2008 Jena, Germany 
freedominfo.org Freedominfo.org: The 
Online Network of 




02/08/2008 Washington DC 
freedomtotinker.com Freedom To Tinker...is 
your freedom to 
understand, discuss, 






27/09/2008 Princeton, New 
Jersey 
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02/08/2008 Washington DC 




02/08/2008 Washington DC 




02/08/2008 Washington DC 
gnu.org GNU Operating System Software (NSA) 11/10/2008 e-mail 
addresses only
gnupg.org The GNU Privacy Guard Software (NSA) 30/08/2008 e-mail 
addresses only
googleblogspot.com Blog Site Search Engine 
Blog (NSA) 
27/09/2008 Google in 
Mountain View 
California 
gpoaccess.gov GPO Access: A Service 




30/08/2008 Washington DC 
guardian.co.uk The Guardian News/Media 
(NSA)
30/08/2008 London, UK 









02/08/2008 Washington DC 
hasbrouck.org The Practical Nomad Reference Site 
(NSA)
08/11/2008 San Francisco 
healthprivacy.org Health Privacy Project Advice and 
Advocate 
(NSA)
30/08/2008 Washington DC 




hhs.gov  United States 




02/08/2008 Washington DC 
hrw.org Human Rights Watch Advocate 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 London, UK 
icann.org  Internet Corporation for 












30/08/2008 London, UK 





02/08/2008 e-mail address 
only 




02/08/2008 London, UK 













02/08/2008 Toronto, Ontario 
iris.sgdg.org Imagions un Réseau 
Internet Solidaire 
French Affiliate 




02/08/2008 (see EDRI) 
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isoc.org Internet Society Research 
(NSA) 





James Madison Project Advocate 
(NSA)
30/08/2008 Washington DC 
junkbusters.com  JunkBusters: Bust the 







justice.gov.uk Ministry of Justice Government 
Agency (SA)
11/10/2008 London, UK 
latimes.com  The LA Times News/Media 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 Chicago, Illinois 




libertycoalition.net  Liberty Coalition Advocate 
(NSA)





02/08/2008 London, UK 
my.barackobama.com  Barack Obama and Joe 







02/08/2008 Chicago, Illinois 







news.bbc.co.uk BBC News News/Media 
(NSA)
27/09/2008 London, UK 
no2id.net NO2ID Advocate 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 London, UK 
nocards.org CASPIAN Advocate 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 US 
nytimes.com  New York Times News/Media 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 New York, New 
York 






02/08/2008 Paris, France 








peacefire.org  Peacefire: Open Access 






pgp.com  PGP Co Commerical 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 Uxbridge, UK 




02/08/2008 E-mail address 
only 




02/08/2008 Washington DC 





02/08/2008 See PI and EPIC 
(London) 
privacyactivism.org  Privacy Activism Advocate 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 Only e-mail 
address listed
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privacyinternational.org  Privacy International Advocate 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 Washington DC 





privacyrights.org  Privacy.org Advocate 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 San Diego, 
California 
privacytimes.com  Privacy Times News/Media 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 San Diego, 
California 
publicknowledge.org Public Knowledge: 




13/09/2008 Washington DC 
rcfp.org  The Reporters 
Committee for Freedom 





realnightmare.org  Real Nightmare (ACLU) Advocate 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 New York, New 
York 
regulations.gov  Regulations.gov: Your 




02/08/2008 Only e-mail 
address listed 




02/08/2008 Paris, France 
schneier.com  Bruce Schneier Research 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 e-mail address 
only 





02/08/2008 New York, New 
York 
spamcop.net  SpamCop.net IT Advice (NSA) 02/08/2008 US (exact 
location 
unknown32)




02/08/2008 US (exact 
location 
unknown) 
statewatch.org  Statewatch Advocate 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 London, UK 




02/08/2008 London, UK 
tor.eff.org  Tor: anonymity online See EFF 02/08/2008 See EFF 





02/08/2008 Syracuse, New 
York 
un.org The United Nations State Level 
Operative (SA)
02/08/2008 New York, New 
York 
unhchr.ch  Office of the Higher 





02/08/2008 New York, New 
York 




11/10/2008 Washington DC 












                                                     
32 This can occur for several reasons including the author having a personal address, which they do not wish to reveal online or 
the site only contains a form or box for mailing queries, as opposed to an e-mail, telephone or postal address.  
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wired.com Wired News News/Media 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 New York, New 
York 
youtube.com  YouTube Social 
networking Site 
(NSA)
02/08/2008 San Bruno, 
California 
 
